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“Inch by inch, life's a cinch.” 
 
― John Bytheway  
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 Income classification shifting involves opportunistically misclassifying core expenses 
into nonrecurring items in order to boost core earnings. Recent studies have documented large 
sample evidence of its existence (e.g. McVay 2006; Fan et al.,2010; Barua et al.,2010). 
Managers engage in income classification shifting because they believe the market in general 
and financial analysts in particular focus on core earnings. If financial analysts are experts in 
forecasting permanent earnings, they should be expected to identify reported core earnings that 
have been inflated through classification shifting and revise their future earnings forecast 
accordingly. Consistent with my prediction, I find that given the same amount of earnings news, 
analysts revise their future quarterly earnings forecasts by half as much for classification shifters 
than for non-classification shifters, suggesting analysts recognize that income classification 
shifters’ core earnings are less likely to persist into the future. However, I also find that analysts 
fail to fully gauge the impact of classification shifting on future earnings, leading to more 
optimistically biased forecasts for classification shifters. Finally, classification shifting makes it 




This study examines whether financial analysts can identify income classification 
behavior and how they respond to such behavior as reflected in their future earnings forecasts. 
Income classification shifting refers to a type of earnings management technique used to inflate 
core earnings by intentionally misclassifying core expenses such as cost of goods sold and 
selling and administrative expenses as non-recurring items. Management has incentives to boost 
core earnings because core earnings are typically valued higher than non-core earnings. As core 
earnings, by definition, should reflect the performance of regular business operations that is more 
likely to persist in the future, they are weighted more in firm valuation than other non-recurring 
earnings components. Therefore, both the academics and practitioners have emphasized the 
importance of using core earnings in the valuation of firms. In fact, security analysts are known 
to exclude certain nonrecurring or unusual components from their forecasts of earnings, which 
are often referred to as “street earnings” (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Gu and Chen 2004). Given 
the significant market consequences of meeting/beating analyst expectations (Bartov et al. 2002; 
Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Skinner and Sloan 2002), it is not surprising that management is 
found to use classification shifting to hit analyst earnings forecast benchmarks (McVay 2006; 
Barua et al. 2010; Fan et al. 2010). However, with classification shifting, the core earnings are 
artificially hyped when recurring expenses are removed.
1
 An interesting question then becomes 
are analysts able to adjust for the temporary effects of the income classification shifting as 
reflected in their earnings forecasts? How will income classification shifting affect the attributes 
of their forecasts?  
                                                          
1
 Assume a firm’s core earnings pre classification shifting is $1. Further assume the firm’s core earnings is a 
perpetuity discounted at 10%, then the present value of the core earnings should be $10. After moving $0.2 of core 
expense into special items, its core earnings post shifting is now $1.2. The present value of the core earnings now 
becomes $12. If the firms is valued based only on the valuation of core earnings, then it will be overvalued.  
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The motivation for this study is to increase our understanding of the impact of income 
classification shifting on market participants. Income classification shifting is recently 
recognized as the third form of earnings management in addition to accrual management and real 
earnings management (McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010). While the literature on accrual 
management and real earnings management is large and extensive, studies on income 
classification shifting are relatively sparse and limited. However, there is evidence that income 
classification shifting may have significant economic consequences. For instance, McVay (2006) 
find that in her sample, on average $287 thousand of regular operating expenses are shifted to 
special items per firm annually, resulting in an average increase in their core earnings by half a 
cent per share. Firms with income-decreasing special items of at least 5% of sales shift an 
average of $1.66 million per firm per year, or roughly three cents per share.  In addition, the SEC 
has also expressed concerns over the proper classification of accounting items in financial 
statements and has frequently filed civil law suits against firms charged with misclassification of 
ordinary operating expenses as non-recurring expenses.
2
 Apparently, the SEC is concerned that 
income classification shifting can potentially mislead investors and impair market efficiency. As 
financial analysts are important users of financial statement information, understanding how 
income classification shifting affects analysts’ information outputs should be of interest to 
regulators, investors, and academics.  
This study also aims to extend the literature on analysts’ ability to identify earnings 
management and incorporate it into their reports. The academic literature has documented 
extensive evidence of earnings management; however, our understanding of how financial 
analysts deal with potential earnings management and its impact on their earnings forecasts is 
                                                          
2
 For SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement release regarding  financial reporting related enforcement actions 
brought by the SEC in federal court, please go to http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/friactions.shtml . 
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quite limited. For instance, Burgstahler and Eames (2003) have shown that analysts impound 
their expectation of earnings management to avoid small losses in their forecasts, even though 
they fail to identify specific instances of such earnings management. They call for research that 
examines whether alternative forms of earnings management are also reflected in analyst 
forecasts. Shane and Stock (2006) find that analysts seem to be unable to appreciate the 
temporary earnings effects from earnings management that shifts income from fourth quarters in 
higher tax rate years to immediately following first quarters of lower tax rate years. They also 
call for research to investigate analysts’ ability to adjust for the earnings effects of earnings 
management in various contexts. Income classification shifting therefore provides an interesting 
setting to examine the above issues because management engages in income shifting as a 
response to the way analysts process earnings numbers. It could potentially provide additional 
insight as to the role of earnings management in analysts’ reports. 
 To identify firms that are likely to engage in income classification shifting, I develop a 
classification scheme base on prior literature (McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010).  McVay (2006) 
documents the existence of income classification shifting by showing a positive relation between 
unexpected core earnings and negative special items and a negative relation between unexpected 
change in future core earnings and negative special items.  I adopt the quarterly core earnings 
expectation model developed by Fan et al. (2010) and devise the expected quarterly core 
earnings changes model based on McVay (2006) and Fan et al. (2010). I then classify a firm as a 
classification shifter if it has positive unexpected core earnings, negative special items and 
negative unexpected change in core earnings.  
 To investigate whether financial analysts recognize that the core earnings of income 
classification shifters are artificially boosted, I examine financial analysts’ quarterly earnings 
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forecast revisions. I find that for the same amount of earnings news, financial analysts revise 
their earnings forecasts by only half as much for classification shifters than for non-classification 
shifters, suggesting that they discount the earnings reported by shifters. However, financial 
analysts’ earnings forecasts are still on average optimistic for classification shifters, indicating 
that they fail to assess the full amount of the earnings inflated in classification shifting. Finally, I 
find that income classification shifting causes financial analysts’ forecast accuracy to deteriorate.  
These results are robust to a battery of tests  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides literature review and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 discusses the data 




2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Income Classification Shifting 
Income classification shifting refers to management’s intentional misclassification of 
core expenses such as cost of goods sold, sales and administrative expenses, into non-recurring 
items, including special items and discontinued operations, in an attempt to boost core earnings. 
It has been recently recognized as a third type of earnings management tool studied in the 
literature. Current research recognizes that compared with accruals management and real 
earnings management, income classification shifting confers management the following 
advantages. First of all, income classification shifting is more difficult to detect. Under current 
accounting rules, the classification of expense items can be subjective. It is difficult for auditors 
to identify inappropriate classification. Furthermore, as income classification shifting does not 
change the bottom-line earnings number, auditors have less incentive to uncover the related 
accounts involved in classification shifting.  Secondly, income classification shifting is less 
costly to implement. Compared to real earnings management, where real economic activities or 
transactions are affected, there will be no adverse economic consequences for income 
classification because it involves only pure accounting treatment. Unlike accruals management, 
which is also a type of accounting manipulation,   allocation of accounting items within the 
income statement does not involve accruals that need to be reversed later. Therefore, income 
classification shifting can be a viable tool in management’s repertoire to meet market 
expectations or achieve economic gains (Nelson et al. 2002; McVay 2006; Barua et al 2010). 
 Recent research has provided evidence of the use of income classification shifting by 
management. For instance, drawing on annual US data, McVay (2006) finds a positive 
correlation between unexpected core annual earnings and income-decreasing special items, 
suggesting that core expenses are shifted to special items to inflate core earnings. Fan et al. 
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(2010) extends McVay (2006) to quarterly earnings and documents stronger evidence of 
classification shifting in the fourth quarter than in interim quarters. Barua et al. (2010) further 
show that management also shift core expenses to income-decreasing discontinued operations to 
inflate core earnings. Apparently, income classification shifting occurs outside the US as well. 
Athanasakou et al (2007) find that large firms in the United Kingdom engage in classification 
shifting of core expenses to other non-recurring items to meet analyst forecasts. Haw et al (2011) 
document pervasive use of misclassification among firms in East Asian countries to overstate 
core earnings. There appears to be substantial evidence to validate the existence of classification 
shifting both in the US and around the world. 
 As an earnings management apparatus, income classification shifting has been associated 
with various capital market incentives. Most notably, there exists evidence that classification 
shifting is used to meet analyst forecasts (McVay 2006; Barua et al. 2010; Fan et al. 2010)
3
. This 
is plausible because analysts are known to focus on “street earnings” or core earnings in their 
analysis and forecasts (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Doyle et al. 2003; Gu and Chen 2004).
4
 
Classification shifting can boost such earnings significantly. McVay (2006) documents that for 
firms with income-decreasing special items of at least 5% of sales, classification shifting can 
increase core earnings by three cents per share. Classification shifting is also more likely to 
happen in the fourth quarter for firms that just meet or beat analyst forecast (Fan et al., 2010). In 
fact, in both UK and East Asia, meeting analyst forecasts has been cited as one of the major 
incentives for management to misclassify core expenses as special items (Athanasakou et al. 
                                                          
3
 McVay (2006) finds that firms are  more likely to engage in classification shifting  when it enables them to meet or 
beat analyst  forecasts. However, it does not examine how classification shifting affects analyst forecasts for the next 
period, which is the focus of this study. 
 
4
 Bradshaw and Sloan(2002) find that street earnings as reported by analyst tracking agencies such as IBES are 
diverging from GAAP earnings in the recent years and are more value relevant than GAAP earnings as well. 
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2007; Haw et al. 2011). Finally, there is also initial evidence of the manipulation of core earnings 
around seasoned equity offerings (Siu and Faff 2012). 
2.2 Earnings Management and Analysts’ Forecasts 
Financial analysts play an important role in the capital markets. As information 
intermediaries, analysts are considered sophisticated users of financial information that analyze 
and interpret accounting data in formulating their forecasts. Analyst forecasts predict future 
earnings more accurately than time-series models ( Brown et al. 1987 a,b). They are also less 
biased than the earnings expectations implied by stock prices (Mendenhall 1991; Ababanell and 
Bernard 1992). Because their forecasts can have significant impact on market earnings 
expectations with substantial financial consequences (Skinner and Sloan 2002), management has 
great incentives to meet those market expectations. Earnings management is one way for 
management to achieve such earnings targets.  
Current literature, however, offers no consistent evidence as to whether analysts are 
efficient in identifying earnings management and incorporating it in their earnings forecasts. 
Ettredge et al. (1995) document that analysts seem to be able to draw on additional information 
to identify ex ante possible overstatement in quarterly earnings and effectively eliminate one 
fifth of the dollar amount of the overstatements in their earnings forecast revisions following the 
most recent quarterly earnings announcement. Burgstaler and Eames (2003) investigate the issue 
in the case of earnings management to avoid losses and small earnings decreases as documented 
in Burgstahlaer and Dichev (1997). Basically, they examine the distribution of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts around zero and find a similar pattern to the one in realized earnings. Specifically, their 
forecast of earnings levels and changes contain fewer observations to the left of zero and more 
observations to the right of zero, resulting in a kink in the forecast distribution around zero. Such 
evidence is interpreted as suggesting that analysts anticipate earnings management to avoid 
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losses and earnings decrease and include such earnings management in their forecast. However, 
analysts do not seem to be capable of identifying specific instances of earnings management at 
the firm level, leading to forecast optimism at zero earnings forecasts and forecast pessimism at 
zero earnings realizations. In other words, they tend to predict earnings management that is not 
realized and fail to predict earnings management that is realized.  
Considering that firms manage earnings in response to analysts’ forecasts, Liu (2006) 
posits that analysts are aware of these earnings management practices, and incorporate such 
expected behavior into their forecasts. Assuming analysts aim to minimize their forecast errors, 
she documents that analysts systematically forecast below (above) the otherwise non-strategic 
forecasts( forecasts of earnings that have not been managed to meet or beat analyst’ forecasts) 
for firms that are more likely to manage earnings downward (upward). Using a sample of 
earnings restatements and cases where upward earnings management is most likely, Givoly et al. 
(2010) show that analysts’ forecasts are more closely related to the managed earnings, suggesting 
that analysts forecast the managed earnings number. They also issue more optimistic earnings 
forecasts and more positive recommendations in cases of upward earnings management, which 
are unwarranted given subsequent performance. These results make it difficult to draw definitive 
conclusions on whether analysts are capable of detecting earnings management. Arguing that 
analysts should be more concerned with forecast informativeness than forecast accuracy, Louis 
et al. (2012) find analysts’ deviations from management pre-announced earnings are negatively 
associated with abnormal accruals, indicating that analysts intend to forecast the unmanaged 
earnings when they perceive that management earnings guidance involves earnings management. 
Such finding therefore suggests when management earnings guidance differs from analyst 
forecasts, analysts are able to tell whether earnings management exists and forecast what they 
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consider the “true” earnings number. However, it is not obvious whether analysts can detect 
earnings management when no management guidance exists. 
In fact, Bradshaw et al. (2001) document that analysts’ earnings forecast errors are 
negatively associated with the level of accruals, indicating that on average analysts do not 
completely understand that higher accruals are associated with lower future earnings. Assuming 
these extreme accruals result from earnings management, then such a finding implies that 
analysts cannot effectively appreciate the implications of accruals for earnings management.    
There is also evidence that not only do analysts fail to detect broad accruals management, 
they also lack the ability to recognize specific types of earnings management. For instance, 
Shane and Stock (2006) find that analysts do not account for the effects of income shifted from 
higher tax rate years to lower tax rate years in their earnings forecasts. Both Chaney et al. (1999) 
and Hanna and Orpurt (2006) find that analyst forecast accuracy decreases and forecast 
dispersion increases when firms report nonrecurring items including restructuring charges. As 
earnings manipulation is highly susceptible in those instances, these results suggest that analysts 




3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Income Classification Shifting and Analyst Forecast Revision 
When firms engage in income classification shifting, their current period core earnings is  
overstated by the core expenses, which will recur in the next period, leading to lower future core 
earnings. Consequently, these core earnings are unlikely to persist into the future.  After firms 
make earnings announcements each quarter, analysts reassess their earnings forecasts for future 
periods. If a firm's actual earnings are greater (lower) than analysts’ expectations, then analysts 
may revise their forecasts of the firm’s future earnings upward (downward). The magnitude of 
the forecast revision is a function of the persistence of the forecast error (Easton and Zmijewski 
1989). In other words, analysts are expected to respond more to permanent earnings and less or 
little to transitory earnings. If analysts are able to recognize that the earnings news in 
classification shifters’ core earnings are less persistent, they will adjust their forecasts to a lesser 
degree. On the other hand, if they are unable to identify or unwilling to incorporate such 
classification shifting behavior into their forecasts, then ceteris paribus their forecast revisions 
will not differ between classification shifters and non-shifters. In order to examine whether 
analysts’ forecast revisions reflect the lower persistence of classification shifters’ current 
earnings news, I test the following hypothesis: 
H1: Ceteris Paribus, financial analysts adjust their quarterly earnings forecast revisions to 
a lesser degree for income classification shifters than for non-shifters. 
3.2 Income Classification Shifting and Analyst Forecast Bias and Accuracy  
Even though analysts may respond less to classification shifters’ earnings news, it is 
unlikely that they will be able to accurately estimate the full extent of shifters’ manipulated 
earnings. As a result, I expect their forecast errors to be more optimistically biased for income 
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classification shifters. In addition, earnings manipulation involved in classification shifting 
makes it more difficult to forecast earnings. Hence I expect analyst forecast accuracy to decline 
for classification shifters.  I therefore make the following predictions regarding analysts’ forecast 
error with regard to income classification shifting. 
H2a: Ceteris paribus, financial analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts are more 
optimistically biased for income classification shifters than for non-shifters. 
H2b: Ceteris paribus, financial analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts are less accurate for 
income classification shifters than for non-shifters. 
12 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Measuring Income Classification Shifting 
4.1.1 McVay (2006) Model 
 When managers shift core expenses to non-recurring items, their core earnings are 
artificially inflated. We would therefore expect a positive relation between classification shifters’ 
unexpected core earnings and the magnitude of the negative special items. Based on this idea, 
McVay (2006) is able to document large sample empirical evidence of the existence of 
classification shifting. To capture income classification shifting, McVay (2006) develops a two- 
step equation system. The first step involves an expected core earnings level and changes model. 
  CEt = β0 + β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt + β3ACCRUALSt-1 + β4ACCRUALSt  + β5∆SALESt + 
β6NEG_∆SALESt + εt         (1) 
ΔCEt = ɸ0 + ɸ 1CEt-1 + ɸ 2ΔCEt-1 + ɸ 2ΔATOt + ɸ 3ACCRUALSt-1 + ɸ 4ACCRUALSt  +  
ɸ 5∆SALESt + ɸ 6NEG_∆SALESt + εt                                                             (2) 
 
Where:  
CEt=(Sales – COGS – SGA expenses)/Sales 
ATOt=Asset Turnover Ratio (Sales/Average NOA) 
Accrualst=(Net Income before Extraordinary Items – CFO)/Sales 
∆Salest=% change in Sales from year t-1 to t 
NEG_∆SALESt=1 if ∆Salest  is negative, and 0 otherwise 
UE_CEt=Reported core earnings minus expected core earnings 
SIt=Income-decreasing special items/Sales 
 
 The core earnings level model includes lagged core earnings, CEt-1, because core 
earnings are likely to persist. Asset Turnover Ratio, ATOt, is included because it is found to be 
negatively related to profit margins (Nissim and Penman 2001). The definition of core earnings 
in this model is close to profit margins. Both current and lagged accrual levels(Accrualst, 
Accrualst-1 ) are associated with firm performance (Sloan 1996; DeAngelo et al. 1994), they are 
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included as controls. Even core earnings is scaled by sales, sales growth (∆Salest) is included 
because as sales grow, fixed costs become smaller per sales dollar. As costs increase more when 
activity arises than they decrease when activity falls by the same amount(Anderson et al., 2003), 
NEG_∆SALESt  is introduced to allow the slope to differ between sales increase and decreases. 
 The change in core earnings model includes both lagged core earnings, CEt-1, and the 
change in core earnings from year t-2 to t-1, ΔCEt-1 so that the degree of mean reversion varies in 
the model based on prior year’s level of core earnings(Freeman, et al., 1982; Fama and French 
2000). In addition, they are included because both levels and changes are used to forecast 
changes in profitability ( Fama and French 2000; Fairfield and Yohn 2001; Penman and Zhang 
2002). In addition, level of asset turnover is replaced with change in asset turnover(ΔATOt ). The 
remaining variable in the level model stay in the changes model.  
These two models are run cross-sectionally by industry and fiscal year. The predicted 
values from the model measure expected core earnings, CEt, and expected change in core 
earnings, ΔCEt, respectively. The difference between reported (changes in )core earnings and 
expected (changes in) core earnings yield unexpected core earnings (UE_CEt) and unexpected 
change in core earnings(UE_ΔCEt).  
If managers shift core expenses to non-recurring items, we should expect a positive 
relation between classification shifters’ unexpected core earnings and the magnitude of the 
negative special items. To document such relation, in the second step, McVay (2006) estimates 
the following two regressions: 
UE_CEt = α0 + α1 %SIt + εt        (3a) 
      UE_ΔCEt+1 = α0 + α1 %SIt + εt                                                           (3b) 
 In the first equation 3a, the coefficient α1 is expected to be positive if income 
classification shifting does occur. However, firms with negative special item may experience 
14 
 
restructuring or other economic event that results in real performance improvement. To rule out 
such alternative explanation, future unexpected change in core earnings is regressed on negative 
special items and the coefficient is expected to be negative. The rationale is that firms that 
classification shift is expected to have a lower than expected change in core earnings in year t+1 
with large special items in year t.  
4.1.2 Fan et al. (2010) Model 
 One of the major limitations of the McVay (2006) model is that the positive relation 
between expected core earnings and special items may be driven mechanically by the inclusion 
of current accruals. The inclusion of accruals is aimed to control for extreme firm performance. 
However, accruals may also contain special item accruals. Therefore, high special item accruals 
drive down expected core earnings and result in higher unexpected core earnings, which is 
positively related to special items in the second step regression. In fact, when accruals are taken 
out of the model, the relation between unexpected core earnings and special items becomes 
negative (McVay, 2006). Such criticism of the McVay(2006) model leads to the development of 
refined core earnings level model by Fan et al.(2010) as stated below: 
CEq = β0+β1CEq-1 +β2CEq-4 +β3ATOq +β4ACCRq-1+β5ACCRq-4 +β6ΔSALESq 
+β7NEG_ΔSALESq +β8RETURNSq+β9RETURNSq-1+εq                                (4a) 
 The major differences between the Fan et al. (2010) and the McVay (2006) model are 
twofold. First of all, current accruals are removed and only lagged accruals are retained. Second, 
both the current period returns, RETURNSq, and last period returns RETURNSq-1, are added to 
the model as controls for performance. This model therefore relieves the concern that the 
positive relation between unexpected core earnings and special items is mechanical. As the paper 
seeks to examine whether income classification shifting differs between the fourth quarter and 
the other three quarters, the model is run using quarterly data.  
15 
 
4.1.3 Identifying Income Classification Shifters 
 In order to identify income classification shifters, I adopt the core earnings level model as 
developed Fan et al. (2010) using quarterly data . In addition, drawing on the McVay (2006) and 
Fan et al. (2010) model, I devise the quarterly core earnings changes model as follows: 
ΔCEq = δ0+δ1CEq-1 +δ2ΔCEq-1+δ3CEq-4 +δ4ΔCEq-4 +δ5ATOq +δ6ACCRq-1+δ7ACCRq-4  
+δ8ΔSALESq +δ9NEG_ΔSALESq +δ10RETURNSq+δ11RETURNSq-1+νq   (4b) 
 
 The model is estimated cross sectionally by industry and fiscal year. The difference 
between reported changes in core earnings and the expected change in core earnings as predicted 
from the model yields unexpected change in core earnings(UE_ΔCEt+1).  As discussed above, for 
classifications shifters, their unexpected core earnings(UE_CEt) are expected to be positively 
related to special items in t and their unexpected change in future core earnings(UE_ΔCEt+1) are 
expected to be negatively related to special items in t. Therefore, I classify firms as income 
classification shifters if they have positive UE_CEt, negative %SIt and negative UE_ΔCEt+1. 
4.2 Income Classification Shifting and Analysts’ Forecasts 
4.2.1 Analyst Forecast Revisions 
 To examine whether analysts can identify and incorporate income classification shifting 
behavior in their forecast revisions, I estimate the following regression for our sample of firms 









= Analyst Forecast Revision, calculated as the difference between the first analyst 
mean forecast for quarter q+1 after the earnings announcement in quarter q and the 
last analyst mean forecast for quarter q+1 before earnings announcement in quarter 
q, scaled by beginning of period stock price. 
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FEi,q          = Analyst Forecast Error, calculated as the difference between I/B/E/S actual EPS and 
the last analyst mean forecast for quarter q, scaled by beginning of period stock 
price. 
SHIFTi,q     =  1 if the firm has positive unexpected core earnings and negative special items in 
quarter q  and negative unexpected change in core earnings in quarter q+1. 
JustMETi,q  =  1 if the firm reported an earnings forecast error equal to $0.00 or $0.01. 
LOSSi,q       =  1 if operating income before depreciation(oibdpq) in quarter t is less than zero, 0 
otherwise 
RESTi,q         =  1 if the firm reported a restructuring charge in quarter t, 0 otherwise 
 Analysts revise earnings estimates based on earnings news. Therefore, analyst forecast 
error, FEi,q, is included to control for earnings surprise. Firms are more likely to classification 
shift when it enables them to meet analyst earnings forecast (McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010). I 
include a dummy JustMETi,q to control for analyst forecast revision for firms that just meet or 
beat analyst earnings forecasts(Kaznik and McNichols 2002). Previous research has found that 
analysts tend to overpredict earnings to a greater degree for firms suffering from losses or 
negative stock returns (Ali et al. 1992; Klein 1990). Therefore, I include a dummy variable for 
firms that report an operating loss in quarter q. Finally, firms that classification shift have 
negative special items. These special items may include restructuring charges. Chaney et al. 
(1999) find that analysts’ forecast revision of next period’s earnings is on average negative for 
firms that announce restructuring charges. Therefore, I include a dummy variable for firms that 
have non-zero restructuring charges. I also include industry dummies to control for any industry 
effects on analyst forecasts.  
 If analysts recognize that income classification shifter’s core earnings have lower 
persistence, they would revise their forecasts to a lesser degree. Therefore, I would expect the 
coefficient on Shiftq, γ2, to be negative. Further, I would predict the coefficient on the interaction 
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term FEi,q*SHIFTi,q, γ3, to be negative, meaning that for the same amount of earnings news, 
analyst earnings revisions would be lower for shifters than for nonshifters. 
4.2.2 Analyst Forecast Bias and Accuracy 
 To examine the bias and accuracy of analysts’ forecasts for classification shifters, I 
estimate the following regressions.  
FEi,q+1=λ0+λ1FEi,q+λ2SHIFTi,q+ λ3ACCRi,q +λ4RESTi,q+λ5RESTi,q+1+λ6RETi,q+λ7RETi,q+1 
  +λ8NANALYSi,q+1+λ9SIZEi,q+1+μi,q+1          (6) 
|FEi,q+1|=α 0+α 1 |FEi,q|+α 2SHIFTi,q+ α 3ACCRi,q +α 4RESTi,q+α 5RESTi,q+1+α 6RETi,q  
+α7RETi,q+1  +α8NANALYSi,q+1+α 9SIZEi,q+1+ξ i,q+1        (7) 
Where: 
FEi,q+1    = Analyst Forecast Error, calculated as the difference between I/B/E/S actual 
EPS
5
 and the first analyst mean forecast for quarter q+1, scaled by beginning 
of period stock price. 
FEi,q     = Analyst Forecast Error, calculated as the difference between I/B/E/S actual EPS 
and the last analyst mean forecast for quarter q, scaled by beginning of period 
stock price. 
|FEi,q+1|  = Forecast Accuracy, calculated as the absolute value of analyst forecast error 
for quarter q+1, FEq+1, scaled by beginning of period stock price 
|FEi,q|    = Forecast Accuracy, calculated as the absolute value of analyst forecast error 
for quarter q, FEq, scaled by beginning of period stock price 
SHIFTi,q  = 1 if the firm has positive unexpected core earnings and negative special items   
in quarter q  and negative unexpected change in core earnings in quarter q+1. 
ACCRi,q = Operating Accruals, calculated as net income before extraordinary items (ibq) 
minus cash from operations (oancfy), scaled by Salesq. 
RESTi,q      = 1 if the firm reported a restructuring charge in quarter q, 0 otherwise 
SIi,        = 1 if the firm reported a restructuring charge in quarter q+1, 0 otherwise 
                                                          
5
According to Bradshaw and Sloan (2002), IBES would regularly exclude such charges as restructuring charges, 
write-downs and impairments, research and development expenditures, merger and acquisitions 




RETi,q       = Three-month market-adjusted value weighted return exclusive of dividends 
corresponding to the fiscal quarter q 
RETi,q+1    = Three-month market-adjusted value weighted return exclusive of dividends 
corresponding to the fiscal quarter q+1 
NANALYSi,q+1= Log of the number of analysts forecasts included in the I/B/E/S mean 
forecast 
SIZEi,q+1    = Log of the total market value of firm i at the beginning of quarter q+1 
 I include lagged forecast errors because previous research has shown that analysts’ 
forecasts exhibit positive serial correlation (Ali et al., 1992). Operating accruals are included 
because Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) document that analyst forecast errors are negatively 
correlated with accruals. Chaney et al. (1999) found that analyst forecasts are biased upward 
subsequent to restructuring charges, so I include a dummy variable, RESTi,q , to control for the 
effect of restructuring charges on analyst forecast. Previous research has also documented that 
the optimistic bias in analyst forecast increases for firms that exhibit large non-recurring charges 
(Hanna and Opurt 2006), so I include SIq as a control variable. Market returns are included 
because there exists evidence that analysts do not use past stock return information efficiently in 
their forecasts (Ali et al., 1992). Finally, both high analyst following and large firm size have 
been shown to be associated with lower forecast error and greater forecast accuracy due to richer 
public information environment (Lys and Soo 1995; Alford and Berger, 1998). 
 If analysts cannot fully adjust their earnings forecasts for the amount of misclassified 
core expenses, then their forecasts for classification shifters will be even more optimistically 
biased. Therefore, I expect a negative coefficient on SHIFTi,q in the forecast bias regression. 
Earnings manipulation through classification shifting will make it more difficult to accurately 
predict future earnings. Therefore, I expect a positive coefficient on SHIFTi,q in the forecast 




Figure 1_Timeline for Measuring Forecast Revision and Forecast Error
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5.  SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
5.1 Sample Selection 
 Data are obtained for the years 1988 to 2010 from the Compustat Industrial Quarterly 
File, I/B/E/S Split-Unadjusted File, and CRSP monthly return file. Following McVay (2006), I 
remove firm-quarter observations with annual sales of less than $1 million to avoid creating 
outliers as a result of scaling variables by sales. To ensure quarterly data are comparable across 
years, I eliminate firms that had a change in fiscal year. Finally, I require at least 15 observations 
per industry-year-quarter to estimate expected core earnings. Industries are classified based on 
Fama and French (1997). The full sample for the core earnings regressions has 126,427 firm-
quarter observations and 6,987 unique firms. The subsample for analysts’ forecasts has 70,306 
firm-quarters and 4,799 unique firms.  
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 The Appendix provides the definitions of the variables used in the analyses. Table 1 
presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the core earnings regression to classify 
classification shifters (Panel A) and for the variables used in the analyst forecast regressions 
(Panel B).  Panel A shows that the mean (median) of core earnings for all firm quarters as scaled 
by sales is 0.096 (0.101). The mean (median) of special items as a percentage of sales is 2.09 
(0.0) percent. Panel B shows that analysts’ earnings forecast revision of the next period is on 
average negative (-0.002). Consistent with prior research that analysts forecasts are optimistic on 
average, analysts’ forecast errors for current period (FEq) and next period (FEq+1) are negative (-
0.003 and -0.004, respectively). About 11.7% of the firm quarters are classified as shifters 
whereas 15.9% of the firm quarters meet or beat analyst forecast by 1 cent. Finally, 13.4% of the 










CEq 0.096 0.101 0.234 0.040 0.185
CEq-1 0.098 0.101 0.231 0.040 0.185
CEq-4 0.095 0.102 0.245 0.041 0.187
UE_CEq 0.001 0.002 0.124 -0.032 0.039
ΔCEq-1,q -0.001 0.000 0.135 -0.025 0.025
ΔCEq,q+1 -0.002 0.000 0.129 -0.025 0.024
UE_ΔCEq-1,q 0.002 0.001 0.325 -0.043 0.048
UE_ΔCEq,q+1 -0.001 0.001 0.309 -0.042 0.046
%SIq 2.09% 0.00% 9.02% 0.00% 0.00%
ATOq 2.156 0.924 4.283 0.393 2.012
ΔATOq 0.048 0.003 2.541 -13.619 15.293
ACCRq-1 -0.170 -0.094 0.458 -0.289 0.024
ACCRq-4 -0.163 -0.093 0.469 -0.290 0.027
ΔSALESq 12.13% 6.95% 0.352 -4.77% 21.29%
NEG_ΔSALESq -0.055 0.000 0.119 -0.048 0.000
RETURNSq 0.007 -0.013 0.225 -0.113 0.094






-0.002 0.000 0.008 -0.050 0.016
FEq -0.003 0.000 0.019 -0.126 0.044
FEq+1 -0.004 0.000 0.024 -0.169 0.051
|FEq| 0.008 0.002 0.021 0.000 0.154
|FEq+1| 0.010 0.002 0.027 0.000 0.203
SHIFTq 0.117 0.000 0.322 0.000 1.000
ΔEARNq -0.013 -0.002 0.056 -0.261 0.238
JustMETq 0.159 0.000 0.366 0.000 1.000
NANALYSq+1 1.368 1.386 0.933 0.000 3.219
LOSSq 0.134 0.000 0.340 0.000 1.000
RESTq 0.102 0.000 0.303 0.000 1.000
RESTCHq -0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.031 0.000
Sizeq+1 6.040 5.945 1.711 2.510 10.664
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Relevant Variables Used to Classify Shifters
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Relevant for Analyst Forecast Regressions
See Appendix for variable definitions. The full sample consists of 126,427 firm-quarter
observations.The sample for analysts' forecasts has 70,306 firm-quarter observations. All
variables except indicator variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles.
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Table 2 compares the shifters and non-shifters on selective firm characteristics. The 
current quarter core earnings for shifters are significantly larger for shifters than for non-shifters 
possibly due to shifting (0.153 vs. 0.138). By design, shifters also have much higher positive 
unexpected core earnings(0.058 vs. -0.004) and much lower negative unexpected change in core 
earnings in the next quarter(-0.122 vs. 0.010).  They also tend to have larger negative special 
items as a percentage of sales (3.85% vs. 1.56%). 19.4% of shifter-quarters have restructuring 
charges compared to only 9% for non-shifter quarters. Finally, shifters on average are larger than 
non-shifters, consistent with McVay (2006).……………………………………………………...   
Table 2 








CEq 0.153 0.135 0.138 0.123 <0.001 <0.001
UE_CEq 0.058 0.031 -0.004 -0.004 <0.001 <0.001
UE_ΔCEq,q+1 -0.122 -0.037 0.010 0.006 <0.001 <0.001
%SIq 3.85% 0.000 1.56% 0.000 <0.001 <0.001
ΔSALESq 0.110 0.062 0.150 0.092 <0.001 <0.001
NEG_ΔSALESq -0.052 0.000 -0.038 0.000 <0.001 <0.001
NANALYSq+1 1.487 1.609 1.352 1.386 <0.001 <0.001
JustMETq 0.153 0.000 0.160 0.000 0.065 0.035
LOSSq 0.108 0.000 0.137 0.000 <0.001 <0.001
RESTq 0.194 0.000 0.090 0.000 <0.001 <0.001
SIZEq+1 6.314 6.248 6.004 5.904 <0.001 <0.001






p-value for statistical 




 Table 3 reports the Spearman/Pearson correlations among the main variables used in the 
core earnings regression to classify classification shifters (Panel A) and for the variables used in 
the analyst forecast regressions (Panel B). The results indicate that analyst forecast revisions are 
negatively correlated with SHIFTq, consistent with analysts discounting the earnings news for 
shifters. Still their forecasts are more positively biased for shifters, consistent with analyst failing 
to fully account for the unexpected lower future core earnings for shifters. Finally, the absolute 
value of analysts’ forecast errors are positively related with SHIFTq, suggesting that their 





Panel A: Spearman/Pearson Correlation Matrix for Relevant Variables Used to Classify Shifters 
 
CEq CEq-1 CEq-4 UE_CEq ΔCEq ΔCEq+1 UE_ΔCEq UE_ΔCEq+1 %SIq ATOq ΔATOq ACCRq-1 ACCRq-4 ΔSALESq
NEG_
ΔSALESq RETURNSq RETURNSq-1
CEq 1.000 0.753 0.663 0.420 0.324 -0.286 0.199 0.010 -0.185 -0.026 0.037 -0.259 -0.281 0.179 0.351 0.072 0.067
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0007) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
CEq-1 0.823 1.000 0.653 0.016 -0.301 -0.073 -0.003 -0.009 -0.122 -0.037 0.010 -0.190 -0.325 0.118 0.277 0.053 0.067
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2569) (0.0041) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0005) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
CEq-4 0.770 0.746 1.000 0.002 0.015 -0.102 -0.014 -0.007 -0.110 -0.045 0.010 -0.305 -0.224 -0.084 0.096 0.005 0.009
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4687) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0197) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0004) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.091) (0.0022)
UE_CEq 0.272 0.028 0.036 1.000 0.560 -0.276 0.451 0.057 -0.082 -0.009 0.026 -0.004 -0.008 0.011 0.015 -0.004 -0.002
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.001) (<.0001) (0.1279) (0.0027) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1199) (0.468)
ΔCEq-1,q 0.216 -0.221 0.023 0.462 1.000 -0.301 0.326 0.020 -0.099 0.016 0.043 -0.096 0.049 0.108 0.123 0.030 0.000
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.9968)
ΔCEq,q+1 -0.214 -0.086 -0.115 -0.187 -0.227 1.000 -0.151 0.321 0.080 -0.015 -0.028 -0.026 -0.019 -0.052 -0.084 0.003 -0.016
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3847) (<.0001)
UE_ΔCEq-1,q 0.187 0.031 0.017 0.646 0.313 -0.140 1.000 -0.034 -0.034 -0.007 -0.013 0.011 -0.003 0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0165) (<.0001) (0.0002) (0.3258) (0.2946) (0.0413) (0.0321) (0.2217)
UE_ΔCEq,q+1 0.037 0.016 0.004 0.091 0.032 0.317 0.048 1.000 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.036 -0.047 -0.003 -0.001
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1448) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2343) (0.4681) (0.9098) (0.8892) (0.3602) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3081) (0.8332)
%SIq -0.040 -0.017 -0.001 -0.022 -0.043 0.034 -0.020 -0.007 1.000 -0.047 -0.014 -0.011 -0.024 -0.070 -0.154 -0.078 -0.057
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.596) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0143) (0.2343) (0.4681) (0.9098) (0.8892) (0.3602) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3081)
ATOq -0.240 -0.262 -0.273 -0.036 0.041 -0.030 -0.024 -0.050 -0.070 1.000 0.400 0.075 0.065 0.019 0.067 0.029 0.027
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
ΔATOq 0.133 -0.002 0.046 0.117 0.254 -0.103 0.057 -0.016 -0.007 0.151 1.000 -0.018 -0.014 0.010 0.025 0.031 0.022
(<.0001) (0.4547) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0085) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0005) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
ACCRq-1 -0.334 -0.314 -0.358 -0.017 -0.024 -0.058 0.002 -0.031 -0.041 0.219 -0.061 1.000 0.352 0.066 0.087 0.007 0.026
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3841) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0118) (<.0001)
ACCRq-4 -0.351 -0.390 -0.328 -0.020 0.064 0.011 -0.008 -0.018 -0.084 0.195 -0.039 0.347 1.000 -0.025 -0.021 0.006 -0.015
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0003) (0.0036) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0242) (<.0001)
ΔSALESq 0.250 0.207 0.067 -0.053 0.092 -0.047 -0.048 -0.073 -0.093 0.081 0.086 0.080 -0.020 1.000 0.568 0.066 0.086
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
NEG_ΔSALESq 0.274 0.232 0.106 -0.067 0.085 -0.055 -0.062 -0.077 -0.096 0.127 0.097 0.064 -0.030 0.843 1.000 0.059 0.073
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0022) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0003) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
RETURNSq 0.117 0.103 0.038 -0.021 0.034 0.015 -0.020 -0.009 -0.053 0.057 0.076 -0.021 -0.010 0.102 0.103 1.000 0.007
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0014) (0.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2186) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0185)
RETURNSq-1 0.116 0.114 0.046 -0.011 0.012 -0.018 -0.009 0.011 -0.043 0.059 0.057 0.003 -0.035 0.116 0.111 0.020 1.000
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0014) (0.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2186) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
See Appendix for variable definitions. The full sample consists of 126,427 firm-quarter observations.The sample for analysts' forecasts has 70,306 firm-quarter observations.Spearman(Pearson) correlations are below(above) the diagonal. All variables except indicator variables 





Panel B: Spearman/Pearson Correlation Matrix for Variables Relevant for Analyst Forecast Regressions 
 
FREVq
q+1 FEq FEq+1 |FEq| |FEq+1| SHIFTq ΔEARNq JustMETq NANALYSq+1 LOSSq RESTq RESTCHq SIZEq RETURNSq RETURNSq-1
FREVq
q+1
1.000 0.381 0.196 -0.290 -0.290 -0.013 0.209 0.052 0.089 -0.189 -0.057 0.109 0.121 0.152 0.080
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
FEq 0.362 1.000 0.301 -0.651 -0.349 0.026 0.358 0.069 0.139 -0.265 -0.003 0.062 0.153 0.111 0.090
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4524) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
FEq+1 0.147 0.276 1.000 -0.287 -0.713 -0.046 0.091 0.043 0.139 -0.144 0.013 0.021 0.154 0.102 0.058
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
|FEq| -0.073 -0.031 -0.014 1.000 0.509 0.007 -0.179 -0.167 -0.231 0.269 0.061 -0.170 -0.283 -0.014 -0.105
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) (0.0594) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0003) (<.0001)
|FEq+1| -0.109 -0.103 -0.052 0.512 1.000 0.035 -0.093 -0.086 -0.221 0.213 0.037 -0.121 -0.261 -0.122 -0.092
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
SHIFTq -0.025 0.037 -0.044 0.015 0.023 1.000 0.006 -0.007 0.047 -0.028 0.110 -0.065 0.058 -0.022 -0.029
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1417) (0.0697) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
ΔEARNq 0.212 0.314 0.089 -0.044 -0.061 0.004 1.000 0.026 -0.001 -0.098 -0.021 0.064 -0.007 0.107 0.122
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3298) (<.0001) (0.8455) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0988) (<.0001) (<.0001)
JustMETq 0.013 -0.018 -0.018 -0.579 -0.174 -0.007 0.021 1.000 0.063 -0.040 -0.025 0.025 0.026 0.005 0.006
(0.0011) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0697) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2043) (0.1366)
NANALYSq+1 0.019 0.099 0.091 -0.334 -0.339 0.047 0.005 0.062 1.000 -0.129 0.110 -0.003 0.750 0.016 0.019
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2036) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4148) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
LOSSq -0.096 -0.165 -0.073 0.195 0.184 -0.028 -0.097 -0.040 -0.130 1.000 0.011 -0.066 -0.159 -0.064 -0.061
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0037) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
RESTq -0.050 0.039 0.056 0.059 0.048 0.110 -0.038 -0.025 0.112 0.011 1.000 -0.565 0.158 0.006 0.006
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0037) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1121) (0.1214)
RESTCHq 0.052 -0.034 -0.054 -0.065 -0.053 -0.110 0.047 0.027 -0.103 -0.016 -0.946 1 0.004 -0.006 0.040
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3231) (0.1317) (<.0001)
Sizeq+1 0.039 0.091 0.090 -0.388 -0.386 0.059 -0.006 0.025 0.759 -0.165 0.158 -0.145 1 -0.040 0.067
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1744) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
RETURNSq 0.161 0.160 0.093 -0.027 -0.118 -0.023 0.139 0.007 0.044 -0.078 0.002 0.002 0.012 1 0.034
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0551) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.6076) (0.5809) (0.0021) (<.0001)
RETURNSq-1 0.087 0.085 0.054 -0.107 -0.104 -0.030 0.148 0.006 0.046 -0.075 0.000 0.007 0.110 0.027 1
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1173) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.9454) (0.0795) (<.0001) (<.0001)
See Appendix for variable definitions. The full sample consists of 126,427 firm-quarter observations.The sample for analysts' forecasts has 70,306 firm-quarter observations.Spearman(Pearson) correlations are below(above) the diagonal. All 
variables except indicator variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles.
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 Regression Results for Core Earnings Model 
 Table 4 presents the mean regression results for the expected core earnings level model. 
As expected, prior quarter core earnings is a strong predictor of core earnings, with a mean 
coefficient of 0.544(0.330) for CEq-1 (CEq-4), which is significant at less than 0.0001. Contrary to 
expectations, asset turnover ratio is positively correlated with core earnings. Last quarter accruals 
(ACCRq-1) has a coefficient of -0.036, consistent with higher levels accruals having lower 
earnings persistence. Accruals of four quarters ago (ACCRq-4) has a positive coefficient of 0.003, 
albeit on average not significant. Consistent with Anderson et al. (2003), the slope coefficient on 
sales growth (ΔSALESq) is significantly larger for firms that experience a decline in sales (0.023 
vs. 0.427). The mean adjusted R
2
 is high at 78.26%, ranging from 52.58% for Banks and 91.89% 
for Aerospace.  
Table 5 reports the mean regression results for the expected core earnings change model 
using the quarterly data. The mean adjusted R
2
 is 65.67%, which compares favorably to 51.7% 
for core earnings changes model using the annual data in McVay (2006). It ranges by industry 
from 30.17 for Banks to 85.39% for Books. Again all of the variables are statistically significant 
at the p<0.10 level with the predicted signs. Consistent with mean reversion, the level of core 
earnings is negatively correlated with the change in core earnings (Freeman et al. 1982). The 
change in core earnings from prior quarters (ΔCEq-1 and ΔCEq-4) is negatively correlated with 
change in core earnings in current quarter, consistent with Brooks and Buckmaster (1976). The 
change in assets turnover ratio is not significant in the mean regression, even though the sign is 
consistent with Penman and Zhang (2002). For the majority (52%) of the 2,483 industry-quarter 




Expected Core Earnings Level Model 
 
6.2  Regression Results for Analysts’ Forecasts 
6.2.1 Analyst Forecast Revision 
Table 6 presents the results of Model (5) that examine the effect of classification shifting on next 
quarter forecast revisions. All of the coefficients are significant with the predicted sign. To 
control for cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated residuals, t-
statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by year and firm are reported (Peterson 2007; 
Gow et al, 2010). The coefficient on SHIFTi,q is negative and significant at the 0.001 level, 















 in the Predicted 
Direction
Intercept 0.015 <.0001
CEq-1 + 0.544 <.0001 80.10 92.3
CEq-4 + 0.330 <.0001 72.94 89.2
ATOq - 0.003 0.008 83.25 47.0
ACCRq-1 - -0.036 <.0001 56.34 63.7
ACCRq-4 - 0.003 0.2646 60.85 52.3
ΔSALESq + 0.023 0.0027 65.81 63.4
NEG_ΔSALESq + 0.404 <.0001 47.97 74.3
RETURNSq + 0.021 <.0001 68.91 63.1
RETURNSq-1 + 0.021 <.0001 71.33 57.1
Adjusted R
2 78.76%
Dependent Variable : CEq
See Appendix for variable definitions. There are 126,427 firm-quarter observations and 2,483 industry-quarter 
regressions for the 1990 to 2010 period. The regressions are estimated cross-sectionally by industry and fiscal 
year following (1) below based on Fan et al.(2010). p-values, rather than t-statistics, are provided due to the 
different sample size of the specific regressions, which range from 15 to 439 observations. The overal adjusted 
R
2
 is 78.32%, ranging by industry from 52.58% for Banks to 91.89% for Aerospace.  All variables are 
winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles.
CEq = β0+β1CEq-1 +β2CEq-4 +β3ATOq +β4ACCRq-1+β5ACCRq-4 +β6ΔSALESq +β7NEG_ΔSALESq 




Expected Core Earnings Changes Model 
 
telling is the significantly negative coefficient of the interaction term of forecast error FEi,q and 
SHIFTi,q. In fact, the analyst forecast revision for the earnings news for shifters (0.031) is only 
half as much it is for nonshifters (0.062). This result indicates that analysts believe the core 
earnings news for shifters are significantly less persistent for shifters than for non-shifters, 
consistent with H1.  
As expected, the coefficient on earnings surprise FEi,q is positive and significant at the 
0.001 level, suggesting that analyst adjust their earnings forecasts in response to earnings 














 in the Predicted 
Direction
Intercept 0.023 0.0333
CEq-1 - -0.638 <.0001 75.51 86.75
ΔCEq-1 - -0.220 0.0087 54.73 57.35
CEq-4 + 0.450 <.0001 68.87 84.58
ΔCEq-4 - -0.115 0.0005 55.86 62.79
ΔATOq + 0.001 0.8789 78.41 62.26
ACCRq-1 - -0.034 0.1847 56.22 60.57
ACCRq-4 + -0.007 0.5955 61.26 50.22
ΔSALESq + 0.027 0.1019 65.97 61.30
NEG_ΔSALESq + 0.417 0.0042 50.42 69.83
RETURNSq + 0.030 0.0399 69.47 62.51
RETURNSq-1 + 0.038 0.0563 69.51 56.99
Adjusted R
2 65.67%
Dependent Variable : ΔCEq
See Appendix for variable definitions. There are 126,427 firm-quarter observations and 2,483 industry-quarter 
regressions for the 1990 to 2010 period. The regressions are estimated cross-sectionally by industry and fiscal 
year following (2) below. p-values, rather than t-statistics, are provided due to the different sample size of the 
specific regressions, which range from 15 to 439 observations. The overal adjusted R
2
 is 62.33%, ranging by 
industry from 30.17% for Banks to 85.39% for Books.  All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles.
ΔCEq = δ0+δ1CEq-1 +δ2ΔCEq-1+δ3CEq-4 +δ4ΔCEq-4 +δ5ΔATOq +δ6ACCRq-1+δ7ACCRq-4 +δ8ΔSALESq 




Results of Analysts' Forecast Revision Regressions 
 
earnings forecasts, as indicated by the significantly positive but relatively small coefficient on 
the dummy variable JustMET. This result is opposite to the finding in Kaznik and McNichol 
(2002), where analysts do not reward firms meeting or beating forecast with higher future 
earnings forecasts. Consistent with prior studies, the coefficient on the dummy variable for 
LOSS is negative, suggesting that analysts revise their next quarter ahead forecasts downward 
for firms suffering from a loss. The coefficient on the dummy variable for restructuring REST is 
also negative, consistent with prior evidence that analysts believe firms with restructuring charge 













Intercept -0.001 -3.389 <0.001
SURP + 0.062 9.220 <0.001
SHIFT - -0.001 -5.424 <0.001
SURP*SHIFT - -0.031 -3.175 0.002
JustMET + 0.000 3.540 <0.001
LOSS - -0.003 -5.692 <0.001
REST - -0.002 -4.743 <0.001
INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES






See Appencix for variable definitions. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered




6.2.2 Analyst Forecast Bias and Accuracy 
 Table 7 and 8 report the results of Models (6) and (7) which examine the effects of 
classification shifting on analyst forecast bias and accuracy. In Table 7, the coefficient on 
SHIFT is negative and significant at the 0.001 level. The negative coefficient suggests that 
analysts are more optimistically biased for shifters than for non-shifters. This result, combined 
with our earlier result on forecast revision, indicates that even though analysts may respond less 
to the earnings news for shifters, they cannot accurately assess the full extent of the inflated core 
earnings that will reverse in the next period, which lead to their overestimates shifters’ next 
quarter core earnings. 
 Consistent with expectation, the coefficient on lagged forecast error is positive and 
significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficients on ACCR and REST are non-significant. Contrary 
to expectation, the coefficient on SI is positive but insignificant. The coefficients on both prior 
and current market returns are positive and significant, suggesting that analysts do not reflect all 
information impounded in past stock returns for future earnings. The coefficients on both 
analyst following and firm size are positive and significant, meaning that analyst forecasts are 
less biased upward with greater following and for larger firms. The adjusted R
2
 for this 
regression is 6.09%. 
In Table 8, the coefficient on SHIFT is positive and significant at the 0.001 level. The 
positive coefficient indicates that analysts forecasts are less accurate for classification shifters 
than for non-shifters. This reflects the fact that firms that manipulate their earnings through 
classification shifting make it more difficult for analysts to forecast their earnings accurately.  
The coefficient on lagged forecast error is positive and significant. The coefficient on ACCR is 
not significantly different from zero. Consistent with prior study, the coefficient on REST is 
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positive and significant, suggestion that forecast accuracy is lower for firms that report a 
restructuring charge (Chaney et al. 1999). The variable SI is not significantly different from 
zero. The coefficient on analyst following is negative but not significant. Finally, the coefficient 
on firm size is negative and significant, consistent with larger firms having better information 
environment that makes analyst forecasts more accurate. The adjusted R
2
 for this regression is 
9.27%.  
Table 7 

















Intercept -0.024 -4.075 <0.001
FEi,q + 0.190 2.619 0.004
SHIFTi,q - -0.007 -3.181 0.002
ACCRi,q - -0.001 -1.218 0.112
RESTi,q - -0.001 -0.743 0.229
SIi,q - 0.012 0.425 0.335
RETi,q ? 0.015 4.207 <0.001
RETi,q+1 ? 0.026 3.452 <0.001
NANALYSi,q+1 + 0.002 1.608 0.054
SIZEi,q+1 + 0.003 3.123 <0.001
INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES






See Appendix for variable definitions. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by




Results of Analysts' Forecast Accuracy Regressions 
 
 









Intercept 0.038 5.323 <0.001
|FEi,q| + 0.367 7.456 <0.001
SHIFTi,q + 0.006 3.179 <0.001
ACCRi,q + 0.000 0.556 0.289
RESTi,q + 0.008 3.572 <0.001
SIi,q + 0.018 0.674 0.250
RETi,q ? -0.029 -5.787 <0.001
RETi,q+1 ? -0.010 -1.488 0.932
NANALYSi,q+1 - -0.001 -1.230 0.109
SIZEi,q+1 - -0.005 -4.638 <0.001
INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES






See Appendix for variable definitions. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by 
firm and year. All variables except indicator variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. 
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7.  ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
 
I ran additional analyses to make sure that the results are robust. Specifically, I excluded 
shifting firms that reported restructuring charges, that shifted in the prior quarter q-1, and that 
shifted in the next quarter q+1. I also restricted my sample to those with December fiscal year 
end or to the post-SOX era of 2002. Finally, I reran the analysis using the annual data. The 
following section reports the results of these additional tests.  
7.1 Removing Shifters with Restructuring Charges 
 Previous research has documented that analyst forecast is less accurate and more 
optimistic for firms with restructuring charges (Chaney et al. 1996; Hanna and Orpurt 2006). As 
restructuring charges is a common type of special items and shifting firms are typically special 
item firms, my analyst forecast results could simply be driven by firms reporting restructuring 
charges. To examine whether the evidence that I document is due to this alternative explanation, 
I remove shifters with restructuring charges. As presented in Table 9, the results remain 
qualitatively the same, suggesting that the impact of classification shifting on analyst forecast is 
distinct from that of restructuring charges.  
7.2 Removing Firms Shifting in t-1 or t+1 
It is possible that firms could shift in the year prior to t that is under study. If this is the 
case, then the task of forecasting will be more complex. As a result, my finding may contain 
greater noise. Therefore, I remove firms that also shift in the previous year or in the year after 
and report the results in Table 10 and Table 11, respectively. Again the inferences remain 
essentially the same, suggesting that my findings are not significantly affected by firms that 











Variables DV=FREVi,t+1 DV=FEi,t+1 DV=|FEi,t+1|




























INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES
Number of Observations 67,231 67,231 67,231
Adjusted R
2 7.32% 6.38% 9.36%
Estimated Coefficients
See Appendix for variable definitions. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm 











Variables DV=FREVi,t+1 DV=FEi,t+1 DV=|FEi,t+1|




























INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES
Number of Observations 69,694 69,694 69,694
Adjusted R
2 7.24% 6.08% 9.26%
Estimated Coefficients
See Appendix for variable definitions. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm 









Variables DV=FREVi,t+1 DV=FEi,t+1 DV=|FEi,t+1|




























INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES
Number of Observations 69,694 69,694 69,694
Adjusted R
2 7.04% 6.07% 9.33%
Estimated Coefficients
See Appendix for variable definitions. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm 
and year. All variables except indicator variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. 
37 
 
7.3 Subsample of Post-SOX Period 
 There is evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has a significant impact on financial 
reporting behavior in general and earnings management in particular. It appears that accruals 
management is gradually replaced by other earnings management techniques including real 
earnings management and classification shifting (McVay 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Kolev et al. 
2008). To explore whether my results hold during this period, I restrict my sample to the post-
SOX time frame. In Table 12, we can see that all major results remain essentially the same. 
Table 12 
Regression Results using Quarterly Data Post-SOX 
 
Independent 
Variables DV=FREVi,t+1 DV=FEi,t+1 DV=|FEi,t+1|




























INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES
Number of Observations 32,905 32,905 32,905
Adjusted R
2 6.07% 4.24% 8.73%
Estimated Coefficients
See Appendix for variable definitions. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm 
and year. All variables except indicator variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. 
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7.4 Subsample of December Fiscal Year End Only 
 As my sample consists of firm quarterly data with different fiscal year end, there may 
exist greater variation in the information set available. To increase comparability and to reduce 
noise, I also analyze a subsample consisting of firms with December fiscal year end only. The 
results in Table 13 indicate that my results are not sensitive to this data restriction. 
Table 13 
Regression Results using Quarterly Data with December Fiscal Year End Only 
 
Independent 
Variables DV=FREVi,t+1 DV=FEi,t+1 DV=|FEi,t+1|




























INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES
Number of Observations 45,304 45,304 45,304
Adjusted R
2 5.67% 4.17% 8.13%
Estimated Coefficients
See Appendix for variable definitions. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm 
and year. All variables except indicator variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. 
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7.5 Using Annual Data 
 Finally, I also reran the analyses using annual data. Again, I find results consistent with 
using quarterly data.  
Table 14 
Regression Results using Annual Data 
 
Independent 
Variables DV=FREVi,t+1 DV=FEi,t+1 DV=|FEi,t+1|




























INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES
Number of Observations 24,101 24,101 24,101
Adjusted R
2 7.25% 6.34% 6.33%
Estimated Coefficients
See Appendix for variable definitions. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm 




 Prior literature has documented large sample evidence of income classification shifting. 
However, there is relatively little evidence of its impact on market participants. As investors and 
analysts tend to focus on core earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Gu and Chen 2004), the 
artificially inflated core earnings reported by income classification shifters could have 
significant impact on market’s accurate processing of earning information. 
 Drawing on core earnings level and changes model from McVay (2006) and Fan et al. 
(2010), I am able to classify firms into likely shifters and non-shifters and examine how income 
classification shifting affects analysts’ forecasts. I find that analyst forecast revision is 
significantly less for earnings news by shifters, implying that analysts recognize that the 
opportunistically boosted core earnings by shifters are less likely to persist into the future. 
However, analysts cannot fully assess the extent of the implications of income shifting on future 
earnings, leading to more optimistically biased forecast for shifters. Finally, such earnings 
manipulation also makes it more difficult for analysts to forecast income classification shifters’ 







Abarbanell, J. S. 1991. Do analysts' earnings forecasts incorporate information in prior stock 
price changes? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14(2): 147-165. 
 
Ali, A., & Klein, A. 1992. Analysts' Use of Information about Permanent and Transitory 
Earnings Components in Forecasting Annual EPS. Accounting Review, 67(1): 183-198. 
 
Anderson, M. C., Banker, R. D., & Janakiraman, S. N. 2003. Are Selling, General, and 
Administrative Costs "Sticky"? Journal of Accounting Research, 41(1): 47-63. 
 
Bartov, E., Givoly, D., & Hayn, C. 2002. The rewards to meeting or beating earnings 
expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(2): 173-204. 
 
Barua, A., Steve, L., & Sbaraglia, A. M. 2010. Earnings Management Using Discontinued 
Operations. Accounting Review, 85(5): 1485-1509. 
 
Bradshaw, M. T., Richardson, S. A., & Sloan, R. G. 2001. Do Analysts and Auditors Use 
Information in Accruals? Journal of Accounting Research, 39(1): 45-74. 
 
Bradshaw, M. T. and R. G. Sloan (2002). "GAAP versus The Street: An Empirical Assessment 
of Two Alternative Definitions of Earnings." Journal of Accounting Research, 40(1): 41-
66. 
Brown, L. D., Hagerman, R. L., Griffin, P. A., & Zmijewski, M. E. 1987. Security analyst 
superiority relative to univariate time-series models in forecasting quarterly earnings. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 9(1): 61-87. 
 
Brown, L. D., Richardson, G. D., & Schwager, S. J. 1987. An Information Interpretation of 
Financial Analyst Superiority in Forecasting Earnings. Journal of Accounting Research, 
25(1): 49-67. 
 
Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I. 1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and 
losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(1): 99-126. 
 
Burgstahler, D. C., & Eames, M. J. 2003. Earnings Management to Avoid Losses and Earnings 
Decrease: Are Analysts Fooled? Contemporary Accounting Research, 20(2): 253-294. 
 
Chaney, P. K., Hogan, C. E., & Jeter, D. C. 1999. The effect of reporting restructuring charges 
on analysts' forecast revisions and errors. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 27(3): 
261-284. 
 
Cohen, D., A. Dey, and T. Lys. 2008. Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre- 
and post-Sarbanes-Oxley periods. The Accounting Review 83 (3): 757-878. 
 
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., & Skinner, D. J. 1994. Accounting choice in troubled companies. 




Givoly, Hayn & Yoder. 2010. Do Analysts Account for Earnings Management? Working Paper. 
 
Doyle, J. T., Lundholm, R. J., & Soliman, M. T. 2003. The Predictive Value of Expenses 
Excluded from Pro Forma Earnings. Review of Accounting Studies, 8(2/3): 145-174. 
 
Easton, P. D., & Zmijewski, M. E. 1989. Cross-Sectional Variation in the Stock Market 
Response to Accounting Earnings Announcements. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 11(2,3): 117-141. 
 
Ettredge, M., Shane, P. B., & Smith, D. B. 1995. Overstated Quarterly Earnings and Analysts' 
Earnings Forecast Revisions. Decision Sciences, 26(6): 781-801. 
 
Fairfield, P. M., & Yohn, T. 2001. Using Asset Turnover and Profit Margin to Forecast Changes 
in Profitability. Review of Accounting Studies, 6(4): 371-385. 
 
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. 1997. Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial Economics, 
43(2): 153-193. 
 
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. 2000. Forecasting Profitability and Earnings. Journal of Business, 
73(2): 161. 
 
Fan, Y., Barua, A., Cready, W. M., & Thomas, W. B. 2010. Managing Earnings Using 
Classification Shifting: Evidence from Quarterly Special Items. Accounting Review, 
85(4): 1303-1323. 
 
Gow, I. D., Ormazabal, G., & Taylor, D. J. 2010. Correcting for Cross-Sectional and Time-
Series Dependence in Accounting Research. Accounting Review, 85(2): 483-512. 
 
Gu, Z., & Chen, T. 2004. Analysts' treatment of nonrecurring items in street earnings. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 38: 129-170. 
 
Hanna& Orpurt. 2006. Analysts' Earnings Forecasts and the Recognitiono f Nonrecurring 
Charges. Working Paper. 
 
Haw, I.-M., Ho, S. S. M., & Li, A. Y. 2011. Corporate Governance and Earnings Management 
by Classification Shifting. Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(2): 517-553. 
 
Kasznik, R., & McNichols, M. F. 2002. Does Meeting Earnings Expectations Matter? Evidence 
from Analyst Forecast Revisions and Share Prices. Journal of Accounting Research, 
40(3): 727-759. 
 
Klein, A. 1990. A direct test of the cognitive bias theory of share price reversals. Journal of 




Kolev, K., C. A. Marquardt, & S.E. McVay. 2008. SEC Scrutiny and the Evolution of Non-
GAAP Reporting. The Accounting Review 83(1): 157-184. 
 
Liu, X. 2005. Analysts' Response to Earnings  Management. Dissertation. 
 
Louis, H., Sun, A. X., & Urcan, O. 2012. Do analysts sacrifice forecast accuracy for 
informativeness? Management Science, 29(4): 1249-1271. 
 
Lys, T., & Soo, L. G. 1995. Analysts' Forecast Precision as a Response to Competition. Journal 
of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 10(4): 751-765. 
 
McVay, S. E. 2006. Earnings Management Using Classification Shifting: An Examination of 
Core Earnings and Special Items. Accounting Review, 81(3): 501-531. 
 
Mendenhall, R. R. 1991. Evidence on the Possible Underweighting of Earnings-Related 
Information. Journal of Accounting Research, 29(1): 170-179. 
 
Nelson, M. W., Elliott, J. A., & TarpIey, R. L. 2002. Evidence from Auditors about Managers' 
and Auditors' Earnings Management Decisions. Accounting Review, 77(4): 175. 
 
Nissim, D., & Penman, S. H. 2001. Ratio Analysis and Equity Valuation: From Research to 
Practice. Review of Accounting Studies, 6(1): 109-154. 
 
Penman, S. H., & Xiao-Jun, Z. 2002. Accounting Conservatism, the Quality of Earnings, and 
Stock Returns. Accounting Review, 77(2): 237-264. 
 
Shane, P. B., & Stock, T. 2006. Security Analyst and Stock Market Efficiency in Anticipating 
Tax-Motivated Income Shifting. Accounting Review, 81(1): 227-250. 
 
Skinner, D. J., & Sloan, R. G. 2002. Earnings Surprises, Growth Expectations, and Stock Returns 
or Don't Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies, 
7(2/3): 289-312. 
 
Sloan, R. G. 1996. Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash Flows About 





























Unexpected Core Earnings, calculated as the difference between the reported and predicted core 
earnings(CEq), estimated from the follwing model by industry-year-quarter, excluding firm i:
CEq = β0+β1CEq-1 +β2CEq-4 +β3ATOq +β4ACCRq-1+β5ACCRq-4 +β6ΔSALESq 
+β7NEG_ΔSALESq + β8RETURNSq+β9RETURNSq-1+εq 
Definition
Core Earnings, calculated as Sales(saleq) - Cost of Goods Sold(cogsq) - Selling, General, and 
Administrative Expenses (xsgaq) in quarter q scaled by Sales (saleq)
Change in Core Earnings, calculatd as CEq+1 - CEq
Unexpected Change in Core Earnings in quarter q+1, calculated as the difference between the 
reported and predicted change in core earnings (ΔCEq), estimated from the follwing model by 
industry-year-quarter, excluding firm i:
ΔCEq = δ0+δ1CEq-1 +δ2ΔCEq-1+δ3CEq-4 +δ4ΔCEq-4 +δ5ATOq +δ6ACCRq-1+δ7ACCRq-4 
+δ8ΔSALESq+δ9NEG_ΔSALESq +δ10RETURNSq+δ11RETURNSq-1+νq  
Special Items(spiq) as a percentage of sales(saleq). Income-decreasing special items are multiplied 
by -1, and are set to 0 where special items are income-increasing.
Asset Turnover Ratio, calculated as Salesq/((NOAq+NOAq-1)/2), where NOAq, or net operating 
assets, is opearting assets minus opearting liabilities. Opearing assets are calculated as total 
assets(atq) less cash and short-term investoments(cheq). Operating liabilities is calculated as total 
assets(atq) less total debt(dlcq and dlttq), less book avlue of common and preffered equity(pstkq 
and cstkq), less mnority interst(mibq). Average NOA is required to be positive. 
Operating Accruals, calculated as net income before extraordinary items(ibq) minus cash from 
operations(oancfy), scaled by Salesq.
Change in Asset Turnover, calculated as ATOq-ATOq-1.
Percentage Change in Sales, calculated as (SALESq-SALESq-4)/SALESq-4
Three-month market-adjusted value weighted return exclusive of dividends corresponding to the 
fiscal quarter
Analyst Forecast Revision, calculated as the difference between the first analyst mean forecast for 
quarter q+1 after the earnings announcement in quarter q and the last analyst mean forecast for 
quarter q+1 before earnings announcement in quarter q, scaled by beginning of period stock price
Forecast Error, calculated as the difference between I/B/E/S actual EPS and the last analyst mean 
forecast for quarter q, scaled by beginning of period stock price
Log of the number of analysts forecasts included in the I/B/E/S mean forecast for quarter q
1 if the firm reported a restructuring charge in quarter q, 0 otherwise
1 if operating income before depreciation(oibdpq) in quarter t is less than zero, 0 otherwise
ΔSALESq if the percentage change in sales is less than 0, and 0 otherwise.
Log of the total market value of firm i at the beginning of quarter q
1 if the firm has positive unexpected core earnings and negative special items in quarter q  and 
negative unexpected change in core earnings in quarter q+1
1 if the firm reported an earnings forecast error equal to $0.00 or $0.01
Forecast Accuracy, calculated as the absoluate value of analyst forecast error for quarter q, FEq, 
scaled by beginning of preiod stock price
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